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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the German diagnosis related groups (G-DRG) cost accounting scheme by
assessing its resource allocation at hospital level and its tariff calculation at national level. First, the paper reviews
and assesses the three steps in the G-DRG resource allocation scheme at hospital level: (1) the groundwork; (2)
cost-center accounting; and (3) patient-level costing. Second, the paper reviews and assesses the three steps in
G-DRG national tariff calculation: (1) plausibility checks; (2) inlier calculation; and (3) the “one hospital” approach. The
assessment is based on the two main goals of G-DRG introduction: improving transparency and efficiency. A further
empirical assessment attests high costing quality. The G-DRG cost accounting scheme shows high system quality in
resource allocation at hospital level, with limitations concerning a managerially relevant full cost approach and
limitations in terms of advanced activity-based costing at patient-level. However, the scheme has serious flaws in
national tariff calculation: inlier calculation is normative, and the “one hospital” model causes cost bias, adjustment
and representativeness issues. The G-DRG system was designed for reimbursement calculation, but developed to a
standard with strategic management implications, generalized by the idea of adapting a hospital’s cost structures to
DRG revenues. This combination causes problems in actual hospital financing, although resource allocation is
advanced at hospital level.
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Diagnosis related groupsBackground
The German diagnosis related groups system (G-DRG
system) was based on the Australian Refined DRG sys-
tem (AR-DRG system), and was introduced mandatorily
in 2004 for the whole acute inpatient sector except psy-
chiatric and psychosomatic treatment. Besides reim-
bursement calculation, DRGs are now important for
budgeting and cost control in hospital management [1].
Thus, an exact full cost approach for the complete cycle
of care for a medical condition should be the goal of the
costing processes [2]. The G-DRG system and its stan-
dardized cost accounting scheme are used for nationalCorrespondence: matthias.vogl@helmholtz-muenchen.de
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medium, provided the original work is properlyreimbursement calculation and influence strategic man-
agement decisions in hospitals. The demographic charac-
teristics, diagnoses, and clinical interventions of a patient
define medically and economically homogeneous groups:
DRGs. These groups are allocated by certified grouping
software, getting their parameter settings from the Insti-
tute for the Hospital Remuneration System (InEK), which
is the German calculation authority responsible for reim-
bursement rates. The accuracy of reimbursement and the
practical relevance of the standardized cost accounting
scheme are dependent on precise resource allocation and
an unbiased, representative tariff calculation by the InEK.
Yet resource allocation at hospital level and tariff calcula-
tion at national level for German inpatient relative prices
(case-mix) are rarely reviewed and assessed in the litera-
ture. Although many arguments are already scattered in
the literature, an overall assessment of the G-DRG cost
accounting scheme is still lacking.Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution























Figure 1 Goals in the G-DRG costing process.
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mented by (partly self-negotiated) reimbursement for
special treatments or technological innovation not yet
in the DRG catalog [3,4] and by DRGs without case
weights (ca. 40) [5]. These DRGs are reimbursed separ-
ately for each hospital as a result of inhomogeneity of
care, resulting in high variance in costs or a very small
calculation base [6]. Hospital costs can be calculated
according to the InEK calculation scheme at different
aggregation levels (hospital/department/DRG group/
DRG/case) to compare the refinanced costs in each cost
category/cost-center segment. This great detail at differ-
ent aggregation levels, up to the patient-level, makes
this scheme very valuable and flexible for strategic
management decisions. All German hospitals have the
possibility to participate in the calculation process for
G-DRG reimbursement rates with their case cost data.
The cost weights of reimbursement rates for DRGs are
recalculated each year by the InEK on the basis of hos-
pitals providing the previous year’s cost accounting data
in a default scheme (263 or 16% of all German hospi-
tals in 2009). Base rates that form the actual reimburse-
ment rates by multiplying them by the calculated DRG
cost weights are the subject of negotiation in each state.
Besides the development of the grouping software, the
InEK cost accounting scheme is the driver for German
inpatient relative prices (case-mix). This de facto
accounting standard not only allows the calculation of
reimbursement rates, it can also be used for bench-
marking, strategic planning, and to compare costs and
revenues in calculating and non-calculating hospitals
[7]. Besides its budget relevance, the G-DRG system
has also started to be used as a pricing system [8]. The
case-mix and the case-mix index contribute to the most
important financial ratios in hospital management be-
sides liquidity, cash flow, and contribution margin [9].
Papers published so far have analyzed the G-DRG sys-
tem in a comprehensive way [10,11]. An explicit ana-
lysis of the costing side and whether G-DRG cost
accounting meets the two main reasons for the intro-
duction of the G-DRG scheme (transparency and effi-
ciency) are not part of the literature yet. Besides
improving efficiency and transparency, the G-DRG
scheme has been suspected of compromising on quality
of care (e.g., early discharge or cream-skimming) and
documentation of service delivery (e.g., up-coding) [12].
As cost accounting has no direct influence on the qual-
ity of care, this aspect is not analyzed in this paper. Al-
though it is difficult to prove this influence, as these
systems (per-diem charges and case fees) did not exist
in parallel, the latest official DRG-impact-evaluation did
not find a negative impact on the quality of care, but
some documentation issues during the years of its
introduction [13].Methods
An executive summary is given of the InEK cost account-
ing scheme at hospital level and on the determination of
reimbursement rates at national level, to show the course
of action in calculating German inpatient relative prices.
To measure improvements since its introduction, and to
enable an objective international comparison and classifi-
cation, an empirical approach is used, measuring cost
homogeneity within DRGs. The three steps of resource
allocation at hospital level and the three steps of tariff
calculation at national level are assessed, with reference
to the two main goals of DRG introduction: improving
efficiency and improving transparency [14]. First, the
paper reviews and assesses the three steps in G-DRG re-
source allocation scheme at hospital level: (1) the
groundwork; (2) cost-center accounting; and (3) patient-
level costing. Second, the paper reviews and assesses the
three steps of G-DRG national tariff calculation: (1)
plausibility checks; (2) inlier calculation; and (3) the “one
hospital” approach (see Figure 1).Resource allocation at hospital level
The groundwork
This section demonstrates the course of action in the G-
DRG cost accounting system to allow a detailed assess-
ment of the ability of the scheme to accommodate dif-
ferentiated resource allocation and precise cost
assessment. Costs of outpatient services and psychiatric
services are calculated separately or are completely
excluded from the calculation (not only in the G-DRG
scheme) [15-18]. Currently, new, separate systems for
psychiatric services and outpatient cases are being devel-
oped within G-DRG costing: cost accounting as
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chiatric services, but with a greater focus on length of
stay concerning calculation and reimbursement [19].
According to the InEK handbook for calculation, partici-
pating hospitals have to build up their case costs and
case calculation. A detailed description of the following
cost accounting scheme is given in the InEK calculation
manual for calculating case costs, version 3.0 [15]. Par-
ticipating hospitals have to meet basic costing modal-
ities: cost allocation on each inpatient case relies on a
full cost approach using actual costs. This full cost ap-
proach refers to DRG-relevant costs only. The audited
annual accounts build the cost frame and the calendar
year defines the calculation period. Direct costs (drugs,
blood, implants, etc.) and overhead costs are distin-
guished for a subsequent allocation. Costs of general in-
direct cost-centers with patient activity are allocated to
the respective direct cost-centers. In particular, labor
costs (medical staff, nursing staff, med.-technical staff,
and ancillary staff ) have to be allocated to cost-centers
according to actual utilization.
Only DRG-relevant costs (necessary for DRG-related
utilization: medical treatment, care, drugs, cures, the-
rapeutic appliance, and board and lodging) remain in
the calculation. Non-DRG-relevant cost categories and
cost-centers have to be eliminated from the calculation
or, in the case of partial relevance, split according to
cost-center-specific, DRG-relevant resource utilization.Full cost approach using actual costs based on
Exclusion of non-DRG-relevant cost categor ies: Expenses relating to ot
and overtime), and non-DRG-relevant  expenses (most amortizations, 
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Figure 2 The cost accounting scheme in the G-DRG system, Source. [1Thus, an exclusion of costs at the highest possible level
of aggregation is claimed (full cost approach based on
DRG-relevance). The most important non-DRG-relevant
costs arise for ambulatory care, research and teaching,
psychiatric care, extraordinary expenses, and expenses
not relating to the calculation period. Non DRG relevant
cost categories are accruals (except for holidays and
overtime), most amortizations, private physician liquidation,
capital costs, tax, insurance, interest, etc. All cost-centers
have to be classified to primary cost-centers (service to
patient) or indirect cost-centers (medical and non-
medical infrastructure). Figures 2 and 3 explain the ground-
work and the subsequent cost-center and patient-level
costing.
Cost-center accounting
The basic initial point in cost-center accounting, defined
by law for all German hospitals, is a defined set of cost-
centers and cost categories. Thus, all German hospitals
comply with the prerequisites of cost-center accounting.
To get closer to the cost-matrix scheme claimed by the
InEK, cost categories have to be merged into groups (see
the cost-matrix in Figure 3), in which the cost categories
of costs on indirect cost-centers switch to medical and
non-medical infrastructure. The use of internal cost allo-
cation methods is restricted to accurate ones that also
take the service exchange between indirect cost-centers
into account, such as the iterative method of assessment the audited annual accounts of a hospital
her periods a nd uncommon expenses, accruals (except for h olidays 
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Figure 3 The cost-matrix for every case, Source [15]. Notes: Cost-centers and cost categories are merged to the cost-center groups and
cost category groups shown in the cost-matrix. Costs are allocated to cases according to the key cost drivers for cost modules shown in the
cost-matrix.
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tion of costs between cost centers, e.g., cases for admin-
istrative costs or floor area for maintenance costs) have
to follow the method of causation. Thus, costs on in-
direct cost-centers have to be allocated to primary cost-
centers, and excluded in case of non-DRG relevance.
Costs on primary cost-centers might have to be relo-
cated to the primary cost-center they accrue in. After
the internal cost allocation, non-DRG-relevant parts of
primary cost-centers have to be excluded from the cal-
culation according to the key cost driver (service/activity
statistics) of the primary cost-center.
Patient-level costing
A uniform cost-matrix for every calculated case has to
be generated according to the cost-matrix in Figure 3.
Cost-centers are allocated to the cost-center groups.
Direct costs, which are compulsory for drugs, implants,
transplants, blood products, costly external services,
etc., are allocated on a patient-basis, according to the
documented utilization. Sometimes, an allocation based
on a clinical distribution model is allowed. This is a
consistent allocation of costs on cases with the sameservices or procedures related to the drug or medical
device. Overhead costs and costs on primary cost-
centers (that are not documented as patient based) are
allocated based on the key cost driver (weighted or un-
weighted) for each cost module in Figure 3. A calcula-
tion of allocation bases that is un-weighted is not
allowed in most cases. This is a uniform distribution of
costs on cases without case-related key cost drivers
(service/activity statistics). In most cost modules, a
weighted calculation of allocation bases is claimed. This
makes case-related key cost drivers for each cost-center
necessary to distribute costs to cases. Examples of
compulsory key cost drivers and service/activity statis-
tics, as in the cost-matrix in Figure 3, are days on the
ward, differentiated operating room minutes, point sys-
tems for diagnostics, radiology, and laboratory services
for the allocation of medical staff costs. The calculation
of allocation bases has to be performed at the level of
primary cost-centers, not at the level of cost-center
groups. This is necessary to get an exact allocation,
based on the actual services and activities in the cost-
center/category, not in the less accurate cost-center/
category groups.
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Plausibility checks
After case-cost calculation at hospital level, tariff calcula-
tion at national level is the second step on the way to
understanding the development of G-DRG reimburse-
ment rates and hospital management decisions. The
InEK uses plausibility and conformity checks on patient-
level data to decide in each case whether costs are calcu-
lated according to the guidelines, and whether the case
can be included in the nationwide DRG-calculation [6].
Therefore, participating hospitals provide case-cost data
(a cost-matrix for every case), clinical case data (diagno-
ses, operations, and procedures, gender, age, etc.), add-
itional service data (further service/activity information,
e.g., operating room minutes, methods of allocation used,
etc.), and a control total for costing based on the audited
annual accounts of the hospital. These data are first
checked for technical and formal errors. Then a medical
check (to test accordance with coding standards), an eco-
nomic check (content based for the hospital, cost-center
groups, and cases), and a check combining both (e.g.,
interdependence of costs and services/procedures) are
used to detect possible documentation or calculation
errors and to allow for correction. Further, the allocation
method and the additional service data are tested in over-
all conformity checks, such as a missing correlation of
costs and service/activity statistics or wrong allocation
methods.
Case costs in cost modules have to relate to case activ-
ity, given default band widths. And the relative costs of
cost-modules also have to be in default band widths to
each other. Participants are informed about errors or
possible errors, and have to revise or explain in several
rounds. Through this process, the quality of the case
costs should be enhanced. All these checks are per-
formed at single patient-level. Case costs of accepted
cases from the hospital are used for calculation if un-
















2004 824 26 144 n/a
2005 878 71 148 n/a
2006 954 82 214 n/a
2007 1,082 105 263 38
2008 1,137 115 249 28
2009 1,192 127 251 33
2010 1,200 143 253 28
2011 1,194 146 263 16
*calculation data always from previous year (e.g., G-DRG system 2011 based on 201the hospital passes overall conformity checks, analyzing
whether the requested calculation methods and pro-
cesses are met. Plausibility and conformity checks have
become more severe in recent years. This has included
shrinking the acceptable band-width in cost modules,
more queries that result in more detected calculation
errors, and the introduction of the mandatory delivery of
additional service data, such as requests for very detailed
operating room statistics. The overall percentage of
cases with calculation errors allowed decreased. Because
of the additional service data, conformity checks could
have intensified in recent years. Possible reasons for the
decreased number of calculating hospitals in 2008 are
the introduction of more severe plausibility checks or
the high number of excluded hospitals in the previous
year, which lowered the motivation to participate and
reduced the percentage of cases surviving plausibility
checks (see Table 1).Inlier calculation
The DRG system should group cases medically and cost
homogeneously. Therefore, only “inliers” – cases within a
certain standard length of stay (LOS) period, defined by a
lower and an upper trim point – become part of the cal-
culation for the standard reimbursement rates. Cases
below or above the standard LOS attract deductions or
additional reimbursement to embrace the changed cost
situation [22]. Cases relocated to another hospital before
their mean LOS also attract deductions. By adding the
fees, an effective cost weight is generated for every case.
Upper and lower trim points, and the related deductions
or additional reimbursement, are derived normatively.
For example, the lower trim point is one third of the
average LOS but has a minimum of 2 days. Related for-
mulas (see [11,22]) are not presented here, as they do not
contribute to the assessment of the scheme according to














8.1 2,395,410 84.8 13.5
8.5 2,283,874 83.4 12.8
12.0 2,851,819 80.7 16.1
14.9 2,863,115 67.5 16.3
14.3 2,811,669 72.1 15.8
14.5 3,075,378 70.3 16.9
14.8 3,257,497 71.8 17.5

































Improvement "inlier" Improvement all cases
R² "inlier" R² all cases






















































































ty CH > 75 %
CH 70 % - under 75 %
CH 65 % - under 70 %
CH 60 % - under 65 %
 CH < 60 %
Figure 5 The Coefficient of Homogeneity over time (based on
each year’s G-DRG system), Source [6,22,25-30].
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The calculation at national level follows the “one hos-
pital” approach, meaning that DRGs of all calculating
hospitals are dealt with as though coming from one hos-
pital. To determine the national cost weight of a specific
DRG, the costs of all accepted inliers within the respect-
ive DRG are divided by the allocation base. Before 2006,
the allocation base was the weighted arithmetic mean of
the costs of all “inliers” meaning that the average case
weight of all inliers was 1 [22]. Since 2006, the allocation
base has been calculated in a way that keeps the sum of
all case weights in Germany constant and also includes
“outliers” to make it comparable over time [23]. Only
changes in the underlying dataset, such as adding or re-
moving DRGs, or changes in supplementary fees affect-
ing DRGs can change the German case weight sum of
2006 as a constant basis. Owing to the development of
the system, an overall technical (methodic/calculative)
effect was induced that influenced case weights, but had
nothing to do with the development of the DRG classifi-
cation. A so-called liquidity effect could arise as a result
of individual, retrospective negotiations for the base rate
of the hospital, as the individual base rate could only
react as a delay to the technical effect. To reduce this ef-
fect and to make the allocation base comparable with
previous years, the calculation of the allocation base had
to change. Reimbursement fees are then calculated by
multiplying the calculated case weights by the – in every
state – separately and recently negotiated base rate. The
negotiation of the base rate is influenced by factors such
as inflation, regional price index, and collective wage
agreements. This base rate was hospital specific (budget
neutral) at the time of G-DRG introduction from 2003
to 2004. From 2005 to 2009 hospital-specific base rates
converged to a state-wide base rate and, from 2010 to
2014, the state-wide base rates should converge to a na-
tionwide base rate in a corridor of 2.5% above and 1.25%
below this nationwide base rate [10,24]. So the “one hos-
pital” approach already reached by calculating DRG cost
weights is further established with base rates until 2014.
An empirical approach to quantify improvements in
G-DRG tariff calculation is to analyze the reduction in
variance of costs, which the G-DRG scheme approaches
by accurate G-DRG tariff calculation. An analysis of the
coefficient of determination R2 over time (G-DRG ver-
sions 2004–2011) shows the explained part of the statis-
tical spread of costs resulting from DRG classification.
On account of the allocation of case costs to nearly
1,200 DRGs, similar costs for cases in high-volume stan-
dardized treatment DRGs and additive components for
special treatments, medical products, etc., the explained
part of inlier case-costs in the G-DRG system is already
very high. Over time, the extent of variance reduction is
measured. Figure 4 shows the explained part of costswith an R2 > 0.8 for inlier cases (R2 > 0.7 with outliers
included) in recent years. However, a ceiling effect is no-
ticeable [6,22,25-31]. The contribution of the increased
number of DRGs to a rising R2 is negligible, with an
adjusted R2 always very close to R2 [6,32]. This high
declared portion of variance is not unusual, as the Aus-
tralian AR-DRG-system from 1998 already showed a re-
duction in variance (RIV) of 68%, and the English PbR
costing system also showed a RIV of over 80% in 2007–
2008 [33,34].
Cost homogeneity of DRGs can be analyzed further
using the coefficient of homogeneity [CH=1/(1+ σ/μ)], a
measure of the statistical spread or the uniformity within
a certain group. It derives from the coefficient of vari-
ation σ/μ (σ= standard deviation, μ=mean). A CH of 1
indicates full homogeneity, whereas a CH close to 0 indi-
cates no homogeneity (see formula). Figure 5 splits the
coefficient of homogeneity of costs into groups and
shows the percentage of DRGs in these groups for the
G-DRG versions 2004–2011 [6,22,25-30]. The coefficient
of homogeneity of costs and the coefficient of determin-
ation R2 from 2004 to 2011 confirm a developing G-
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allocation and cost assessment, with a low unexplained
cost spread within DRGs.
Calculation requirements for participating hospitals
have increased greatly in the last 8 years. Internal cost
allocation methods were very rudimentary at the begin-
ning, especially concerning (non-)medical infrastructure
[11,35]. In former versions of the cost accounting
scheme, infrastructure costs did not have to be distribu-
ted completely to cost-center categories, resulting in an
uncertain allocation of large parts of overall costs.
Accepted key cost drivers to allocate on cases are more
precise now, and less choice is offered. Since 2006,
advanced internal cost allocation methods such as the it-
erative method have been made compulsory, and com-
pensation keys for the allocation are default states [15].
Table 1 gives an overview of calculation activities from
2004 to 2011 [6,22,25-30].Discussion
Resource allocation at hospital level: the groundwork
G-DRG costing excludes the costs of teaching and re-
search, as these have a wide range among hospitals and
not all hospitals have teaching and research units.
Accruals, most amortizations, private physician liquid-
ation, capital costs, tax, insurance, and interest are still
not part of the tariff calculation, although DRG relevant.
This facilitates benchmarking, but contrasts a useful full
cost approach and managerial relevance. Although the
separation of capital costs (historically reimbursed separ-
ately [3]) increases national comparability, it does not re-
spect different capital cost requirements resulting from
the case-mix of a hospital. Thus, an inclusion in G-DRG
costing, as currently developed, is desirable. As it does
not seem applicable to completely reduce reimburse-
ment to DRGs and keep the number of DRGs manage-
able, additional fees for highly specialized services in
various degrees (e.g., for expensive drugs and treatment
or intensive care) are suitable. This allows a fair reim-
bursement of highly specialized or expensive services.
The exclusion of DRG-relevant costs in G-DRG costing
limits efficiency, as reimbursement is then partially not
based on actual costs. Transparency is limited, as the
sources and magnitude of capital costs cannot be com-
pared among hospitals. Systematic, software-based cal-
culation inequalities have to be incorporated when
reflecting a hospital’s DRG costs. Currently, unlike in
Australia, hospitals are free to decide on accounting and
hospital management software. A certification process
such as that applied for the DRG grouping software does
not exist for cost accounting programs referring to the
InEK calculation [36]. Thus, transparency is further
limited.Resource allocation at hospital level: cost-center
accounting
The breakdown of cost-centers into DRG-relevant and
non DRG-relevant costs is sometimes hard to establish,
e.g., because of non-separated working time accounts for
inpatient and ambulant patients. Other difficulties in
cost-center accounting are resolved well: internal alloca-
tion methods such as the iterative method are advanced;
compensation keys are appropriate; and the cost-center/
cost category breakdown is detailed. Key cost drivers at
patient level are allocated on the basis of cost-centers/
categories, not on the basis of cost-center/category
groups, improving accuracy. The hospital costing litera-
ture gives no hints as to how this stage might be
improved. Thus, transparency and efficiency are given at
cost-center level.
Resource allocation at hospital level: patient-level costing
Participation rates in the InEK calculation scheme are
around 16%, as hospitals often do not have the cost
accounting prerequisites to calculate at the patient-level
[37]. Feeder systems in cost-centers such as radiology
cannot provide the key cost drivers necessary (see
Figure 3) to participate in the calculation. A future cost-
modeling approach for non-calculating hospitals might
support representativeness without downgrading the
accounting standards or making participation in the cal-
culation mandatory – which is hardly achievable because
of the costly accounting prerequisites that participation
in reimbursement calculation requires. Providing public
service weights (as in Australia) for hospitals with less
advanced accounting systems or accepting less advanced
key cost drivers in some cost modules are a practical
solutions to this issue [36]. Graded calculation methods,
representing the technical accounting capabilities of a
hospital, as in the English PbR system, are already well-
proven [38]. Still, a high percentage of cost distribution
is based on LOS, and especially for medical DRGs (con-
servative therapy), the fraction of directly case-related
costs is low compared with operative DRGs. Although
key cost drivers allocated to patients improved (see
Figure 3), a sophisticated solution has not been imple-
mented yet. The use of key cost drivers based on old
and imprecise point systems, originally developed for
physician reimbursement, results in imprecise capacity
and resource planning (e.g., operating room or staff
costs for DRGs). Economically sound decisions become
limited. The use of the G-DRG system based on InEK
calculation as a pricing system and not only as a budget-
ing instrument is critical against this background [8]. To
improve costing at the patient-level, Kaplan & Porter
(2011) introduced time-driven activity-based costing
(TDABC) in the hospital [37,39]. This allocation method
defines nearly all costs as variable and includes time as a
Vogl Health Economics Review 2012, 2:15 Page 8 of 12
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/2/1/15key cost driver in a more detailed implementation, such
as duration of clinician visits as an example of direct
costs or the duration of laboratory tests as an example
of indirect costs. In some cost modules, such as physi-
cians in the operating room, TDABC is already imple-
mented in the InEK costing standard. The more detailed
the calculations are, the more precisely and efficiently
management can act; and management decisions be-
come transparent.
Overall, transparency and efficiency in cost accounting
have improved since the introduction of the InEK cost-
ing scheme. The calculation manual for the calculation
of case costs is in its third version now and has
increased costing standards greatly since its introduc-
tion. Its implementation is enforced by improved and
more rigorous plausibility checks. At the hospital level,
the learning effect, paired with developing cost account-
ing software and documentation requirements, has kept
up with increased calculation requirements. After an
adaptation phase, the coding of diagnoses and opera-
tions and procedures has remained relatively stable [13].
Hospitals try to adapt treatments to the DRG-system
(reimbursement) by implementing clinical pathways, also
oriented on the InEK calculation scheme [40], promising
higher efficiency [41] and increased transparency
through better documentation of the course of action.
Tariff calculation at national level: plausibility checks
The claimed advanced cost accounting methods at hos-
pital level contain risks for tariff calculation. The control
for tight band-width in cost modules and further plausi-
bility checks can lead to the exclusion of cases from the
calculation, even if costs are calculated correctly. If the
costs of a case in a single cost module are not in a target
corridor based on previous years, the case might be
excluded [6]. As these corridors are not published, the
actual influence and control mechanism of band-widths
cannot be defined. Future research is needed to analyze
bias caused by band-width control. Too closely meshed
plausibility checks might lead not only to data quality
improvements, but also to an undesirable trimming of
the calculation on InEK plausibility checks. To achieve
high data quality, plausibility checks are both a blessing
and a curse. On the one hand, they enforce improved
cost accounting, resulting in improved data quality. On
the other hand, they might push hospitals into default
band-widths, possibly not representing the hospitals’ ac-
tual cost structure. To improve participation rates, fees
for every case passing plausibility checks were intro-
duced, promoting the focus on plausibility checks and
questioning the “one hospital” approach, as further bias
is introduced. The efficiency goal of DRG introduction is
therefore slightly transgressed, although plausibility
checks contribute to efficiency overall. Transparency isimproved, as calculation errors are reported on a patient
basis in every round. However, the background on band-
width calculation should be reported better and the kind
of calculation errors should be made public (e.g., the top
100 calculation errors) to let hospitals benefit from early
avoidance of these calculation errors in future calcula-
tions. To further reduce the rate of cancelled data, an
automated system should be introduced for reporting
error explanations on a case basis, enabling the InEK to
produce statistics from the hospitals’ point of view on
specialized calculation errors.
Tariff calculation at national level: inlier calculation
That the calculation of length of stay (LOS) thresholds is
highly important concerning incentives for providers has
been shown in detail [42], also implying that coding
issues can be reactions to inlier calculation [43]. Still,
normatively derived upper and lower LOS thresholds
imply systematic failures and possibly underfinancing
[44,45]. The deductions from reimbursement rates due
to short stay are not calculated based on cost accounting
data [44,45]. They follow a “main effort concept,” includ-
ing deductions for services not part of the main effort
[45]. Therefore, other countries such as England do not
use lower trim points [46]. Upper trim points were
introduced to lower the risk of the hospital in com-
plicated cases; however, they also suffer from their
normative derivation. A non-normative costing-based
calculation as in the U.S. (“cost outliers” [47]) or a spe-
cific case-mix for each care day (Victoria, Australia [48])
might be a solution for upper and lower trim points, also
embracing rare DRGs. Otherwise, supererogation can
lead to a reduced effective reimbursement rate [44]. This
partial “system failure” can have dramatic costing
impacts in some cases, as outliers are not in the minor-
ity. The 2011 G-DRG system had an average of 22.3%
outliers (standard deviation 12.7%, ranging from 0% to
83.2% outliers within DRGs) [49]. Inadequate trim point
calculation opens up the discussion of a greater DRG
differentiation, implying unintended single case reim-
bursement and less practicability in the grade of differ-
entiation [13]. That a higher grade of differentiation
might not improve welfare has already been shown in
econometric models [50]. Still, consistent outliers can be
a sign of the need for further DRG differentiation.
Expanding additive components in the DRG calculation,
as currently exercised, or outlier-calculation based on
costs might partly resolve this issue and increase eco-
nomic homogeneity [32]. As the generation of outliers is
a necessity to reduce the risk for providers and to create
medically and economically homogeneous groups (R2 is
about 0.1 lower for all cases compared with inliers; see
Figure 4), a focus should be set on the influence of the
accounting system to define outliers. Further, the
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ferring to costs compared with LOS (normative deriv-
ation) [34]. By using the different modules in the InEK
matrix in combination with the date of cost occurrence
for outlier calculation, the less accurate normative deriv-
ation could be replaced. Thus, the current system has
high transparency through normative derivation, but ser-
ious flaws concerning the efficiency of the calculation.
Tariff calculation at national level: the “one hospital”
approach
The “one hospital” approach causes a bias in costs (re-
gional price index, pay scale, etc.), which can be resolved
only partly by the negotiated base rate in every state
concerning reimbursement. The InEK only adjusts
according to wage index/union rates in the regions of
former East Germany [6]. There is no adjustment in the
reimbursement for geographical variations in case-costs
– an obvious disadvantage for high-cost regions. Besides,
owing to the different composition of DRG costs (e.g.,
labor costs, material costs), DRGs are affected by this
non-adjustment to different degrees, which might result
in a preference for less labor-intensive DRGs in high
wage index areas and vice versa. For example average
household income in the 16 German states (Länder) var-
ied between € 4,253 and € 2,617 in 2008 [51]. Although
a unique base rate calculation and few regional adapta-
tions support competition, they might contradict the
care mandate of every German hospital and undermine
the security of full health care supply in every region.
The convergence phase of the base rate resulting in a fu-
ture nationwide base rate shows that the “one hospital”
approach, supporting competition, is the chosen route.
Further, case weights are always 2 years old when pub-
lished. The G-DRG reimbursement of 2012 was calcu-
lated with the 2011 G-DRG scheme, based on data
collected in 2010. The out-of-date issue affects only rela-
tive cost-data (case-mix), as base rates are negotiated for
every year in every state. But the quality of tariff calcula-
tion suffers from out-of-date relative cost-data and espe-
cially from insufficient regional cost adaptation. For
management implications, non-adjustment in the “one
hospital” model is resolved by putting a higher relevance
on the relative cost matrix (the case-mix of a case dis-
tributed to the cost matrix), which has to be multiplied
by a base rate to get the actual cost. For internal man-
agement decisions the base rate can then be adapted to
the question that has to be answered. For example, the
actual costs published by the InEK are not used as a
reference for a hospital’s cases, but the relative costs cal-
culated by dividing the InEK cost matrix for a DRG by
the allocation base (the InEK calculation base rate, see
“Tariff calculation at national level; the “one hospital”
approach”).Another negative aspect of the “one hospital” model is
the unadjusted bias that can be induced by the voluntary
participation of hospitals, as the choice of hospitals to
take part in the calculation can have many different
incentives. In the most favorable case, their motivation
to take part is image, the fee for every calculated case, or
the wish to compare themselves with a nationwide
benchmark, and thus the use of the calculation for in-
ternal management decisions. In the worst case, the hos-
pital already uses the InEK cost accounting scheme or
equivalent systems for internal strategic management
decisions and decides on whether the participation
might affect its own future reimbursement positively or
negatively. This incentive is especially strong when a
hospital knows that it delivers a high percentage of over-
all cases for the calculation of a DRG, or for hospital
chains, where the calculation of one hospital affects the
reimbursement of others. Hospitals that are already very
efficient have a low incentive to reduce their future re-
imbursement by delivering beneficial cases. They have
the overall vicious circle nature of the system in mind
when deciding about participation.
The fact that structure, ownership, and size of the
calculating hospitals in general do not reflect the Ger-
man hospital market is the final problem of the
current “one hospital” approach [11]. There is an over-
representation of medium and large hospitals, as small
hospitals are possibly not able to achieve the costly, IT
and accounting standards required. Concerning owner-
ship, a biased sample can further affect costs, as the
incentive to be efficient depends on ownership struc-
ture (private for-profit, private non-profit, public).
Most of the literature concludes that private for-profit
and private non-profit hospitals are less cost efficient
than publicly owned hospitals [52-54]. However, the
fraction of actual calculation hospitals (ca. 50% private
non-profit, 10% private for-profit, 40% public) does not
correspond with the fraction of potential calculation
hospitals (ca. 42% private non-profit, 25% private for-
profit, 33% public) concerning ownership in recent
years [55]. Although the fraction of publicly owned
calculation hospitals has stayed the same since the
introduction of the G-DRG system, the private non-
profit fraction has increased by ca. 6% and the private
for-profit fraction has decreased by that amount
[22,25-30,55]. Hospitals that have an incentive to im-
prove efficiency also have an incentive to participate in
G-DRG calculation, as this is the only generalized sys-
tem to support management with cost accounting. As
a result, the calculated costs tend to be higher than
the true German mean.
To compare the profitability of calculating hospitals
and non-calculating hospitals in further research might
verify the impact of DRG calculation on management
Table 2 Assessing the G-DRG cost accounting scheme
Goals of G-DRG introduction
Improving efficiency Improving transparency Author’s recommendation
Resource allocation at hospital level




Inclusion of all DRG-relevant costs
Cost-center accounting High standard High standard -




Improving key cost drivers and
further introduction of TDABC
Tariff calculation
at national level




Improving transparency on reasons
for calculation errors
Inlier calculation Low standard/improvements
necessary
High standard Combining normative derivation
with the cost outlier concept




Increasing participation by a lower costing
standard parallel to the currentstandard,
to reduce participation bias
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tioned limitations concerning incentives, structure, own-
ership, and size have to be borne in mind and rethought
by policymakers. Limitations in representativeness and
non-adjustment affect benchmarking and strategic reac-
tions on reimbursement rates concerning the elective
case-mix. They increase the insecurity of hospital man-
agement on published DRG costs. Hospitals react to
changes in the case fees catalog by changing their elect-
ive case-mix [48] – a regionally shaped DRG supply situ-
ation can develop, and a vicious circle is initiated
concerning the motivation for participation. In contrast,
the U.S. has a system that adjusts reimbursement rates
for urban and rural areas, for a disproportionate share of
poor patients, for regional wage levels, and for teaching
[56,57]. The English Payment by Results (PbR) -system
uses market force factors (MFF) to adjust to the regional
cost situation [16,58]. The adoption of adjustment
mechanisms as in the PbR system or the U.S. system
would be beneficial for the G-DRG scheme concerning
incentives to participate; however, it would lead to over-
all efficiency losses on account of less competition.
The G-DRG cost accounting system helps to organize
the elective DRG-portfolio. Only departments/DRGs
with a positive perspective are established or developed;
the system protects from misdirected investments, but
also favors DRGs with a high yield. The comparability
and reproducibility resulting from a standardized G-
DRG tariff calculation scheme are of great interest.
Transparency and efficiency of tariff calculation are ser-
iously transgressed by the non-representative calculation
sample and the motivation to participate. One option to
adjust for non-representativeness in the long run is to
make the participation of hospitals in InEK cost
accounting compulsory. Without reducing the quality ofcost accounting by forcing hospitals with less advanced
costing abilities to participate, the most important step
is to introduce a score that is assigned to the cost mod-
ules in the matrix, representing the quality of the alloca-
tion methodology for that cost module. The English
patient-level information and costing system (PLICS)
uses such scores to allow for a high participation rate
[59]. To motivate hospitals to reach a high score, the
current case fees for cases calculated correctly could de-
pend on score size. Hospitals with less advanced meth-
ods can also use key cost driver statistics from hospitals
using advanced calculations (official relative value units)
to distribute their costs on cases. For an overview of the
impact of cost accounting modalities on transparency
and efficiency, see Table 2.
Conclusions
This paper assesses the major cost accounting steps in
their impact on the goals of G-DRG introduction: im-
proving transparency and efficiency. Based on the highly
differentiated cost module and patient-based calculating
structure, the InEK calculation scheme for DRG costs
has become a de facto standard for benchmarking in in-
patient cost accounting and management, and seems to
be developing dynamically. The empirical approach has
quantified improvements in G-DRG tariff calculation.
The system offers most of the tools necessary to improve
efficiency. Transparency and efficiency are reached in
the calculations at hospital level, with few improvements
possible at an advanced patient-based level, such as
time-driven activity-based costing or a consistent full-
cost approach. However, problematic incentives for par-
ticipation in the calculation can bias the calculated costs;
the G-DRG tariff calculation has a representativeness
problem. Although having advanced plausibility checks,
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situation better in other countries. Advancing tariff cal-
culation in hospital financing reforms is a necessity to
improve efficiency and transparency in health care man-
agement in the long run.
The InEK was able to increase the sample of calculat-
ing hospitals, supporting high calculation standards con-
cerning resource allocation at hospital level, but facing
methodological problems concerning tariff calculation at
national level, such as comparability or inlier calculation
issues. As tailored to suit market needs, the standardized
cost accounting in the G-DRG system leads to more effi-
cient resource use, more efficient provision of capacity,
more transparent and efficient cost-and activity control,
and greater competition [13,60]. The latest official DRG-
impact-evaluation by Fürstenberg et al. (2011) showed
that average length of stay was further reduced within
the DRG phase, and average overall costs did not grow
faster than before G-DRG introduction (2% per year)
[13]. The G-DRG system was designed for reimburse-
ment calculation, but has developed to a standard with
strategic management implications, generalized by the
idea of adapting a hospital’s own cost structures to DRG
revenues. This combination causes problems in actual
hospital financing, although resource allocation in the
costing scheme is advanced. Still, the G-DRG costing
scheme is the best starting-point for management deci-
sions and for the implementation of further patient-level
costing. With the mentioned limitations, especially con-
cerning tariff calculation at national level, the current G-
DRG costing scheme can be considered to be efficient
and transparent.
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